US and Australian agencies publish playbook for cutting critical systems off in a crisis

New joint guidance tells power, water and transport operators how to run in isolation when a cyberattack or geopolitical crisis forces the plug to be pulled.

ThreatVectr NewsdeskAI-assistedPublished Updated · Editor: Lee Brown· 4 min read
A power station control room with operators standing before a wall of monitors, some screens going dark as critical systems are deliberately isolated, paper doc
Illustration made with AI. Not a photograph of the events described.
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Key points

  • CISA and the Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre, working with the FBI and international partners, released joint guidance called CI Fortify.
  • The document tells organisations how to cut vital operational systems off from other networks and keep them running alone for an extended period.
  • It walks operators through spotting critical systems, mapping connections, and putting hard separation points in place.
  • The guidance is a response to rising cyber threats against services like power, water and healthcare.
  • No specific incident, group or ransom demand is named; this is preventive advice, not a breach notification.

A group of Western cyber agencies has published a step-by-step guide for keeping the lights on, literally, when a cyberattack hits critical services.

The document is called CI Fortify: Advice for isolating vital systems. It comes from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre, working with the FBI and international partners.

The target audience is narrow but important: the companies that run power grids, water plants, ports and railways. The operators of the machinery that keeps modern life ticking.

What is the guidance actually telling operators to do?

It tells them to plan, in advance, how to disconnect their most vital equipment from the rest of the corporate network and the internet, then keep that equipment running on its own for a long stretch.

That matters because most critical services today are tangled up with ordinary IT. The control system for a water treatment plant might share a network with the email server and a supplier's remote maintenance tool. If criminals get into either, they can often reach the rest. Our 21 July story on why stolen logins keep opening the door to power grids and water plants showed exactly how that gap gets exploited before any isolation plan can kick in.

CI Fortify asks operators to work through three practical jobs. Identify which systems are truly vital, not just important. Map every connection into and out of them. Then build clear cut-off points so those systems can be sealed off quickly if something goes wrong.

Why publish this now?

Because attacks on critical infrastructure haven't stopped climbing, and Western governments are openly worried about both criminal ransomware crews and state-backed hackers positioning themselves inside utilities.

Ransomware, malicious software that scrambles a victim's files until a payment is made, has already hit hospitals and local water utilities in recent years. US officials have repeatedly warned that hackers linked to China and Russia have been quietly burrowing into energy and transport networks, apparently ready to cause disruption in a future crisis. A 23 July federal advisory we covered named the specific techniques Iranian hackers used to break into industrial control systems made by major equipment vendors.

The CISA page frames CI Fortify as advice for exactly that kind of scenario: a serious cyber incident, or a geopolitical flare-up, where an operator might have to yank vital systems off the wider network and run them manually for days or weeks.

What does this mean for ordinary customers?

Nothing changes today. There's no breach, no stolen data, no ransom demand attached to this announcement. It's guidance aimed at the engineers and executives who run essential services.

The practical upside, if operators follow it, is that a future cyberattack on a utility is less likely to cascade into a full outage. A water company that's rehearsed cutting its treatment plant off from its office network stands a much better chance of still delivering clean water while it cleans up an intrusion.

Step What operators are asked to do
1. Identify List the systems whose failure would stop essential services
2. Map Document every network link, remote access route and dependency
3. Separate Build and test physical or logical cut-off points
4. Sustain Plan to operate in isolation for an extended period

The agencies aren't promising this will stop every attack. They're trying to make sure that when one lands, the damage stops at the fence. Given how many critical-infrastructure intrusions begin with a single trusted credential or an unpatched controller, that fence needs to be built before the attacker arrives.

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