iCloud Private Relay Has a Leak: Researchers Show How Safari's Privacy Shield Can Spill Real IPs

A flaw in how Apple's WebKit handles certain web requests lets sites see the IP address Private Relay was meant to hide.

ThreatVectr Newsdesk· 4 min read
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Key points

  • Researchers have found a way to bypass Apple's iCloud Private Relay and see a Safari user's real IP address, the number that identifies their internet connection.
  • The bypass abuses how WebKit, the engine that powers Safari, routes some types of web traffic outside the Private Relay tunnel.
  • Private Relay was launched with iOS 15 in 2021 and is available to paying iCloud+ subscribers.
  • Apple designed Private Relay with two hops so that no single company, not even Apple, can link a person to the sites they visit.
  • Ordinary users do not need to panic, but anyone relying on Private Relay for serious privacy should treat it as leaky until Apple ships a fix.

Apple's iCloud Private Relay was sold as a quiet win for privacy. New research says it is not as watertight as advertised.

Security researchers have disclosed a weakness that can force Safari to reveal a user's real IP address, the unique number your internet provider hands your device, even when Private Relay is switched on. The finding was first reported by The Hacker News.

What is iCloud Private Relay, in plain English?

It is Apple's built-in privacy tool for Safari. When it is on, your web browsing takes a detour through two separate relay servers, so no single company can see both who you are and which sites you are visiting.

Apple launched it with iOS 15 in 2021 and bundled it into the paid iCloud+ subscription. Think of it as a lighter cousin of a VPN, a virtual private network, which is software that hides your internet address by routing traffic through another server. The twist is the two hops: Apple handles the first, a partner company handles the second, and neither is supposed to have the full picture.

That design is the whole point. If it works, even Apple cannot tie your identity to the websites you load.

How does the bypass work?

The researchers found that certain web requests inside Safari slip out of the Private Relay tunnel and go straight to the open internet. When that happens, the site on the other end sees the user's true IP address instead of a relay's.

The issue sits inside WebKit, the browser engine Apple uses for Safari and requires every other iOS browser to use as well. Not every request a webpage makes is neatly funnelled through the proxy. A malicious or nosy site can trigger the kinds of requests that leak.

It is the same shape of bug the web has seen for years with VPNs and Tor Browser: the tunnel covers most traffic, but a side channel, often WebRTC or a background network call, quietly gives the game away. Novel target, familiar failure mode.

Should ordinary users worry?

Probably not much. For most people Private Relay still does what it says on the tin, which is to stop advertisers and network snoops from casually building a profile of your browsing.

The people who should care are those whose safety depends on hiding their location: journalists working with sources, activists, domestic abuse survivors, anyone in a country where the wrong website in your history is dangerous. For that group, "mostly private" is not private enough.

If you are in that bracket, do not rely on Private Relay alone. Pair it with a reputable VPN, or use Tor Browser on a desktop for the sessions that matter.

What has Apple said?

Apple has not published a public fix at the time of writing, and no CVE identifier, the standard tracking number given to a confirmed software flaw, has been attached to the bypass yet. Private Relay is still officially in "beta" years after launch, which gives Apple room to patch quietly.

Expect a WebKit update to close the specific leak. Whether the underlying design holds up to more prodding is the more interesting question. Two-hop proxies are only as private as their weakest edge, and browsers have a lot of edges.

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