iCloud Private Relay Has a Leak: Researchers Show How Safari's Privacy Shield Can Spill Real IPs

Key points

• Researchers have found a way to bypass Apple's iCloud Private Relay and expose a Safari user's real IP address, the number that identifies their internet connection.
• The bypass abuses how WebKit, the engine powering Safari, routes some web traffic outside the Private Relay tunnel.
• Private Relay launched with iOS 15 in 2021 and is available to paying iCloud+ subscribers.
• Apple designed Private Relay with two hops so no single company, not even Apple, can link a person to the sites they visit.
• Anyone relying on Private Relay for serious privacy should treat it as leaky until Apple ships a fix.

Apple's iCloud Private Relay was sold as a quiet win for privacy. New research says it isn't as watertight as advertised.

Security researchers have disclosed a weakness that can force Safari to reveal a user's real IP address, the unique number your internet provider hands your device, even when Private Relay is switched on. The finding was first reported by The Hacker News.

What is iCloud Private Relay, in plain English?

It's Apple's built-in privacy tool for Safari. When it's on, your browsing takes a detour through two separate relay servers, so no single company can see both who you are and which sites you're visiting.

Apple launched it with iOS 15 in 2021, bundled into the paid iCloud+ subscription. Think of it as a lighter cousin of a VPN, a virtual private network that hides your internet address by routing traffic through another server. The twist is the two hops: Apple handles the first, a partner company handles the second, and neither is supposed to have the full picture. If it works, even Apple can't tie your identity to the websites you load.

How does the bypass work?

Certain web requests inside Safari slip out of the Private Relay tunnel and travel straight to the open internet. When that happens, the site on the other end sees the user's true IP address instead of a relay's.

The issue sits inside WebKit, the browser engine Apple uses for Safari and requires every other iOS browser to use as well. A malicious or nosy site can trigger the kinds of requests that leak. It's the same shape of bug the web has seen for years with VPNs and Tor Browser: the tunnel covers most traffic, but a background network call quietly gives the game away. Novel target, familiar failure mode.

This fits a pattern we've tracked across [four Safari-related security stories since July](/ story/apple-pushes-emergency-fixes-for-two-flaws-already-being-used-to-attack-iphones-), including a WebKit zero-day being actively exploited in the wild. On 21 July we reported that Apple's Hide My Email feature leaked real addresses for over a year before a fix shipped. A privacy layer quietly misbehaving is not a new story for this company.

Should ordinary users worry?

Probably not much. For most people Private Relay still stops advertisers and network snoops from casually profiling your browsing.

The people who should care are those whose safety depends on hiding their location: journalists working with sources, activists, domestic abuse survivors, anyone in a country where the wrong website in your history is dangerous. For that group, "mostly private" isn't private enough. Pair it with a reputable VPN, or use Tor Browser on a desktop for sessions that matter.

What has Apple said?

Apple hasn't published a public fix at the time of writing, and no CVE identifier, the standard tracking number assigned to a confirmed software flaw, has been attached to the bypass yet. Private Relay is still officially in "beta" years after launch, which gives Apple room to patch quietly.

Expect a WebKit update to close the specific leak. Whether the underlying design holds up to more prodding is the more interesting question. Two-hop proxies are only as private as their weakest edge, and browsers have a lot of edges.