A trick in six AI coding helpers lets a poisoned project hijack your laptop
Researchers at Wiz found that popular AI coding assistants, including Amazon Q Developer and Claude Code, can be fooled into writing to sensitive files while asking permission for a harmless one.

Key points
- Researchers at Wiz disclosed a flaw affecting six widely used AI coding assistants that lets a malicious code project quietly take over a developer's computer.
- The affected tools are Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic's Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, and Windsurf.
- The assistant shows the developer a permission prompt for one harmless file, but the actual write lands on a sensitive system file.
- The trick uses symbolic links, a normal operating system feature that points one filename at another location on disk.
- These assistants run with the same access as the human developer, so a silent file swap can mean full machine takeover.
If you use an AI helper to write code and you open a project someone else made, that project can quietly reach past the safety prompts and change files it should never touch.
The research comes from cloud security firm Wiz, first reported by The Hacker News. Six of the most popular AI coding assistants are affected: Amazon Q Developer, Anthropic's Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, and Windsurf.
An AI coding assistant is a program that sits inside a developer's editor and writes or edits code on request. To keep things safe, these tools usually pop up a box asking whether it's OK to edit a given file. The developer clicks yes, and the change goes through.
The file the developer approves isn't always the file that gets written.
The attack uses something called a symbolic link, or symlink. A symlink is a small pointer file that says "when someone opens me, actually open that other file over there." Handy for developers. Also handy for attackers.
A booby-trapped project can include a file called something innocent like notes.txt, which is secretly a pointer to a sensitive system file, say your shell configuration or an SSH key. The AI assistant asks whether it can write to notes.txt. You say yes. The write lands on the real target.
Once an attacker can write to those sensitive spots, they can plant commands that run the next time you open a terminal, giving them full control of the developer's laptop and often the cloud accounts, code repositories and production systems that laptop can reach. Wiz calls the class of bug GhostApproval, because the approval you gave was for a ghost, not the real thing.
We've followed the steady drumbeat of agentic coding vulnerabilities since late June: our 29 June story "Poisoned Repos Can Trick Claude Code Into Opening a Reverse Shell" showed prompt injection alone was enough to weaponize the same tools targeted here.
Should ordinary people worry about this?
Not directly, but the knock-on effects matter. Most people don't run AI coding tools. Developers do, and those developers hold the keys to the apps and banks the rest of us use every day. A laptop takeover at a software company is how customer data ends up on a leak site months later.
If you're a developer or you manage a team of them, treat this as a now problem. Update all six tools to the latest versions. Don't open unknown repositories in an editor that has an AI agent running with file-write permissions. Assume that a permission prompt from your AI assistant is only as trustworthy as the project you have open.
Vendors have been shipping fixes. What the post-mortem will say, eventually, is that permission prompts in AI agents were designed to reassure the human, not to actually verify what the machine is about to do. That gap is the whole vulnerability.
If your AI coding agent can write files, it can write the wrong file. Treat every untrusted repo as hostile until the tool is patched.



